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Preface 
In 2010 a computer worm - Stuxnet - spread over the Internet and hence became 
known to the public. Until this day it is kept secret who is the author of Stuxnet and 
rumours are widespread. It is believed to have been created by the United States of 
America (hereinafter the U.S.) and Israel. Stuxnet is said to be part of an intelligence 
operation called Olympic games – an intelligence operation run by the American 
government. The Olympic games started during the Bush administration and was 
continued by the Obama administration.1  
 
It is believed that the worm was originally planted in the computer network of the 
Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities, the Natanz plant, to slow down Iranian nuclear 
enrichment.2 A slowdown desired by the U.S. to hinder Iran from developing nuclear 
weapons. After a programming error a member of staff brought the worm out of the 
system of the power plant and the worm was spread over the Internet.3  
 
Stuxnet is interesting for a number of reasons. It is subject to rumour spreading as no 
one has, so far, accepted responsibility for being the author of the worm. No one has, 
so far, accepted responsibility for planting the worm in the Iranian nuclear network 
system. Stuxnet might be an example of a weapon in a new kind of warfare - cyber 
warfare. As previously stated, the information on Stuxnet is based on rumours and the 
public might never learn the full truth about Stuxnet but for me it will serve as a good 
hypothetical example for analysing international law on cyber warfare. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, Sanger, The New York Times, 
June 1, 2012. 
2 Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War, Harrison Dinniss, pp 291-292 and Stuxnet virus: worm 
'could be aimed at high-profile Iranian targets’, Beaumont, The Telegraph, September 23, 
2010. 
3 Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, Sanger, The New York Times, 
June 1, 2012.	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1 Introduction 
1.1	  Aim	  	  
 
The growing number of states increasing their capabilities of using computer network 
attacks4 as means of attacking another state5 has made me believe that there is a 
growing need of a discussion on how to handle the use of computer network attacks 
between states in international law. Therefore the aim of this paper is to discuss 
questions such as – whether or not computer network attacks directed from one state 
to another can be comparable to the concept of “armed attack” in the Charter of the 
United Nations and customary international law. Why would it be desirable or 
worthwhile to include computer network attacks under the concept of “armed attack”? 
What would be the potential consequences of doing so? Can existing international law 
handle development of new technology and can it regulate new types of warfare and 
weapons such as computer network attacks?  
 
I will focus on two concepts, namely, the “use of force” and “armed attack” in the 
Charter of the United Nations and customary international law. The concepts are 
closely related, which makes it hard to discuss one without the other. The main aim 
will be to discuss the relation between “armed attack” and “computer network 
attacks” and this because of the right to self-defence that follows with a recognized 
armed attack. 6  However, to discuss the meaning of an armed attack without 
discussing the concept of use of force seems meaningless to me since they are very 
closely interconnected. 
 
In order to analyse if international law, generally regulating the use of force and 
armed attack, can be applicable to computer network attacks it will be necessary to 
discuss why the UN Charter and customary international law are relevant as laws 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Will be defined below. 
5 For further reading see for example World Wide Warfare - Jus ad bellum and the Use of 
Cyber Force, Roscini and Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War, Harrison Dinniss. 
6 For further reading on if a computer network attack can constitute use of force, see: 
Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law, Schmitt and The Law 
of Information Conflict, Wingfield and Tallinn Manual. 
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regulating resort to force – jus ad bellum.7 It is also necessary to analyse the 
argumentation regarding the questions why it can or cannot be possible to apply 
general international law on the use of force and armed attack to computer network 
attacks.  
 
The main questions of this paper will be:  
 
1. What are the international treaty and customary law concepts of "use of force" 
and "armed attack" generally considered to comprise and why are these 
concepts relevant in a discussion on the development of international law 
governing resort to force? 
 
2. What are the arguments in favour of or against applicability of the concept of 
“armed attack” in the Charter of the United Nations or customary international 
law to computer network attacks?  
 
1.2	  Scope	  and	  limitations	  
 
The main focus of this paper will be to discuss the argumentation on applicability of 
existing international regulation to computer network attacks. I will limit my analysis 
to the concepts of use of force and armed attack which are concepts found in the 
Charter of the United Nations and customary international law. International law 
covers a wide spectrum of regulations but due to the limited frames of this paper I 
have decided to limit my analysis to the most relevant laws governing resort to force, 
namely, the Charter of the United Nations and customary international law. To further 
narrow my analysis I will mainly concentrate on the concepts of “use of force” and 
“armed attack”. Armed attack because of its inherent right to self-defence and the use 
of force because it is a fundamental principle of international law, to not use force 
against another state, therefore the need to discuss what these concepts comprise. 
Since the threat to use force normally is lawful if the use of the same kind of force 
would be lawful, I will not consider the extension of “threat” in any further aspect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Law governing the resort to force between states. 
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than necessary for the understanding of this paper.8  Neither will kinetic9 attacks on 
cyber command centrals be included in the concept of computer network attacks.   
 
This paper will focus on computer network attacks in jus ad bellum and not consider 
jus in bello.10 The reason for this limitation is the limited frames of this paper and that 
my interest first fell on the perspective of jus ad bellum. Computer network attacks in 
jus in bello is an interesting subject in development that could be suitable for further 
research.11    
 
Even though article 39 of the Charter, regulating the Security Council’s right or duty 
to determine the existence of a threat to the peace or an act of aggression, is also 
closely related to article 2(4) and the prohibition of use of force and article 51 
regarding armed attack, article 39 will only be considered when necessary in relation 
to 2(4) and 51. This because the aim of this paper is to discuss, among other things, 
when the right to act in self-defence for states comes about and not specifically the 
right to take measures for the Security Council. Neither will I in this paper 
specifically consider the aspects of “non-intervention” and lawful “counter-measures” 
in response to intervention. Consideration of these questions and aspects will only be 
taken when necessary for the understanding of the discussion of an armed attack and 
the use of force. To include both the Security Council’s right to act and the concept of 
non-intervention more than serving as comparison in the analysis would be too 
comprehensive.  
 
The main focus of this paper is computer network attacks carried out between states. I 
will therefore not to any greater extent consider, for example the War on Terror where 
non-governmental groups are authors of attacks, but foremost consider attacks 
attributable to states. Neither will I consider computer network attacks from or 
between individuals or entities for private gain, commonly called cyber criminality, 
more than to give examples of computer network attacks as such. Cyber criminality is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Tallinn Manual, Chapter II, Section 1, Rule 12, para 3. 
9 “Involving or producing movement” – Cambridge Dictionaries Online or “producing or 
causing motion” – Oxford English Dictionary. For example the motion caused by the 
explosion of a bomb. 
10 The law of armed conflict or International Humanitarian law. 
11 For further reading on computer network attacks and jus in bello see for example: Tallinn 
Manual and Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello, Schmitt. 
	   8	  
an increasing problem for both private and public actors and is an interesting subject 
of its own. However due to the limits of this paper I need to keep cyber criminality 
almost fully outside the frames of this paper.12  
 
Cyber operations are normally divided into three types: CNA (Computer Network 
Attack), CNE (Computer Network Exploitation) and CND (Computer Network 
Defence). Computer network attacks aim at “ … disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy … 
” 13  information in computers or computer networks while computer network 
exploitation aims at intelligence collection and gathering data. Computer network 
defence is prevention of the former two, for example through cyber operations or law 
enforcement.14 I will concentrate on computer network attacks because computer 
network exploitation is mainly used for cyber espionage and similar activities and 
therefore considered as cyber criminality. Computer network defence will only be 
referred to in relation to the right to self-defence that follows with an armed attack. 
Hereinafter all sorts of cyber operations that are relevant for this paper to discuss will 
be referred to as computer network attacks.  
 
Theories relevant to the paper will be considered in the analysis. Therefore I do not 
have a specific chapter dedicated to theories.    
  
1.3	  Method	  and	  material	  	  
 
This paper will be a study of the applicability of international law governing resort to 
force (jus ad bellum) to computer network attacks carried out between states. To 
perform this analysis I will examine international law, study state practice, case law, 
preparatory works and doctrine relevant to the subject. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON SECURING OUR NATION'S CYBER 
INFRASTRUCTURE and European Convention on Cybercrime and A/RES/55/63 and 
A/RES/64/25 and Asleep at the Laptop and The Cybercrime Wave That Wasn’t and Global 
Project on Cybercrime and Börsen nästa mål för nätattackerna and Cyberattacker ett stort 
växande hot and Estonia fines man for ”cyber war” and Europa går samman i Cyber Europe 
2012 and Hot om stor aktion på fredag and The real Iranian threat: Cyberattacks. 
13 Cyberwarfare and International Law, Melzer, p 5.  
14 Ibid., pp 5-6.	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There is a high availability of information concerning international law in general. 
Information on computer network attacks, on the other hand, is of more limited scale, 
although increasing.   
 
As previously stated, the Charter of the United Nations and customary international 
law are relevant regulations. The Charter is relevant due to the fact that the concepts 
of use of force and armed attack are codified therein. There is preparatory work that 
can be of guidance for interpretation, which indicates the ideas and norms ruling at 
the time of the creation of the Charter. Customary international law is built on usus 
(state practice) and opinio juris and these concepts will be discussed further in relation 
to international law in general and to computer network attacks specifically. The 
concepts are of importance in the creation of customary law and important in the 
development of the concepts of use of force and armed attack.  
 
The main source regarding case law is jurisprudence from the International Court of 
Justice (hereinafter the ICJ) because of its general acceptance as an international court 
and because the Court has treated relevant concepts for this paper in its judgments. It 
should be taken into consideration that the parties have to recognize the Court’s 
jurisdiction and consent to be part of the proceedings, which is why the jurisprudence 
is of limited scale compared to the number of conflicts regarding resort to force.   
 
The Advisory Opinions of the ICJ do not have any binding effect but the Court states 
that the Advisory Opinions have great legal weight and moral authority and after 
examining other sources such as doctrine I am prepared to acknowledge that this 
seems to be the general view.15 Furthermore, UN-resolutions from the General 
Assembly and the Security Council seem to be generally accepted as reliable sources 
of international law and are applied as such.  
 
The doctrine on computer network attacks in relation to international law is of special 
interest to comment. Many authors refer to each other and there seems to be a certain 
resemblance in their argumentation. Another matter to consider is that some of the 
authors that I have referred to in this paper have also participated in the creation of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 ICJ website. 
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“Tallinn Manual” on cyber warfare. The Manual express consensus among its authors 
and is, at the moment, the most recent text on the subject.16  
 
The Stuxnet worm will serve as an example throughout this paper to substantialize 
questions arising.  
 
2 Computer network attacks  
2.1	  Computer	  network	  attacks	  –	  definition	  and	  overview	  of	  the	  concept	  
 
A computer network attack is an operation that occurs in cyberspace. A suggested 
definition of cyberspace is: 
 
“cyberspace — A global domain within the information environment 
consisting of the interdependent network of information technology 
infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, 
computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.”17  
 
I will concentrate on computer network attacks that are wanted by the developer but 
unwanted by victim of such an attack. Computer network attacks are often developed 
to cause some kind of harm to its victim by interfering with or altering information in 
the attacked network or computer. A definition is given as follows:  
 
“computer network attack — Actions taken through the use of computer 
networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in 
computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks 
themselves.”18  
 
This is the definition that will be used throughout this paper. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Michael N. Schmitt, Heather Harrison Dinniss, Thomas C. Wingfield, Nils Melzer and Eric 
Talbot Jensen. 
17 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, p 77. 
18 Ibid., p 59 and Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War, Harrison Dinniss, p 4.	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The word “attack” in “computer network attack” is, in my opinion, used because it 
refers to an unauthorised entrance to, or use of, a computer network. It can also refer 
to an authorised entrance or use to such extent that the network becomes overloaded 
with information, with the result that, for example, a website goes down. This latter 
form of attack is commonly called DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) or DoS 
(Denial of Service). A computer network attack can also, for example, have the 
construction of a worm or virus. A worm is malicious malware that, unlike a virus, 
does not need a host program to multiply and spread itself, nor does it need human 
intervention for spreading. A worm can spread by copying itself through Internet, for 
example via email. The worm causes harm by changing or modifying files or at least 
by slowing down the infected network.19   
 
Computer network attacks are often associated with hackers and the hacker culture 
and the image of teenagers sitting in a dark room avoiding daylight and social contact 
in real life. Hackers are programmers with developed knowledge about entering 
closed computer networks and systems with the purpose of obtaining classified 
information.20 But these kids or hackers are not the only ones constructing computer 
worms or hacking networks. Computer network attacks are also developed by military 
services on behalf of governments. For example, an American general has admitted 
that the USA has used computer network attacks against Afghanistan since 2010.21  
 
It is a logic question to ask what the purpose would be of engaging in a computer 
network attack. The purpose can be everything from the sole purpose of causing 
damage, to collapsing bank systems or nuclear facilities to paralyse another state. 
Some use computer network attacks for espionage, such as industrial or governmental 
espionage. This kind of attack is difficult to detect since it is normally in the interest 
of the attacker to keep it secret from the victim. A recent example of such an attack is 
the hacking of the email account of the President of the European Council Herman 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Internets mörka sidor Om cyberhot och informationskrigföring, Heickerö, p 37 and Cyber 
Warfare and the Laws of War, Harrison Dinniss, p 296 and Svenska hackare En berättelse 
från nätets skuggsida, Goldberg and Larsson, p 304. 
20 Internets mörka sidor Om cyberhot och informationskrigföring, Heickerö, p 26. 
21 Cyberattacker ett stort växande hot, Olsson, SvD, 2012-10-08 and Cyber Warfare and the 
Laws of War, Harrison Dinniss, p 53-57. 
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Van Rompuy on the 18th of July 2011 where the hackers for 14 minutes could enter 
his email account.22 The purpose of such an attack may be political. One state’s 
government may want to know the standpoint of another government in negotiations 
before a transnational meeting.23 Another purpose can be to find internal military 
strategies or similar information. Another example of computer network attacks used 
for political reasons is the use of DDOS attacks on governmental or other important 
websites. Estonia was in 2007 subject to DDOS24 attacks from Russian hackers who 
were believed to be organised by the Russian government. However, the Russian 
government has denied all responsibility of organising the attacks.25 More recent 
examples of DDOS attacks are the continuous attacks on Sweden and Swedish 
governmental websites during September and October 2012.26 These attacks were 
organised by the hacker organisation “Anonymous” and directed at Sweden and the 
Swedish government as a revenge action to a raid that the Swedish police made on 
PRQ, a web hotel, and because of the Swedish police’s investigation of Julian 
Assange, editor-in-chief and founder of Wikileaks. The attacks caused overload on 
many governmental websites out of which many went down entirely for some time.  
 
2.2	  Computer	  network	  attacks	  as	  modern	  warfare	  -­‐	  From	  bow	  and	  arrow	  to	  
cyber	  warfare	  
 
War has existed for millennia and war technology is in constant development.27 
Beginning with land war and war at sea, new technology made it possible with war in 
or from the air. The next great evolution was when space war was developed where 
bombs could be controlled through satellites. All of these warfare types were based on 
physical attack or with a physical result, for example an explosion. Today we have 
reached cyber warfare, through advanced computer technology where the attack takes 
place in cyberspace, although still sometimes with physical result. This new type of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Cyberattacker ett stort växande hot, Olsson, SvD, 2012-10-08. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Distributed Denial of Service. 
25 Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War, Harrison Dinniss, p 289 and Estonia hit by ”Moscow 
cyber war”, BBC News and Estonia fines man for ”cyber war”, BBC News. 
26 Börsen nästa mål för nätattackerna, Wadendal, SvD, 2012-10-05 och Hot om stor aktion på 
fredag, SvD, 2012-10-03. 
27 For further reading see: The Law of Information Conflict, Wingfield. 
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warfare includes, for example Internet espionage, sabotage or misleading information. 
All these methods have been used in every type of warfare, but are now concentrated 
on being exercised through networks and computers.  
 
Another aspect of computer network attacks is that they are not as expensive for the 
attacking state as classic warfare on land, sea, air and in space.28 Schmitt refers to 
cyber warfare as “war on the cheap”.29 However, it might be expensive to prevent 
these types of attacks. Entire computer network systems must be protected from 
attacks that the victim does not know the construction of or where in the system they 
will enter.   
 
Today we are not only talking about weapons of mass destruction but also “mass 
disruption weapons”.30 Computer network attacks will be more advanced in the future 
and states have developed cyber commands, for example the U.S., United Kingdom, 
China and South Korea. 31  The U.S. Army Cyber Command states that: “This 
represents the next evolutionary step in U.S. Army cyberspace”. 32  Sweden is 
developing a cyber command33 and NATO considers computer network attacks as 
new threats to the organisation34 by stating that “Cyber attacks continue to pose a real 
threat to NATO and cyber defence will continue to be a core capability of the 
Alliance”.35 
 
2.3	  Why	  are	  computer	  network	  attacks	  between	  states	  a	  legal	  issue	  
 
Law affects society and society affects law. Development of new techniques will 
change societies and the way people interact, which will sometimes force legal 
changes. International law is being affected by the societies we live in and the norms 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Internets mörka sidor Om cyberhot och informationskrigföring, Heickerö, pp 30-31. 
29 Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law, Schmitt, p 897. 
30 REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON SECURING OUR NATION'S CYBER 
INFRASTRUCTURE and The real Iranian threat: Cyberattacks, Goldman, CNN Money, 
November 5, 2012. 
31 Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War, Harrison Dinniss, p 53, footnote 78 and World Wide 
Warfare - Jus ad bellum and the Use of Cyber Force, Roscini, pp 97-98. 
32 http://www.arcyber.army.mil 
33 Hemligt förband ska skydda från it-hot, Olsson, SvD, 2012-12-04. 
34 Internets mörka sidor Om cyberhot och informationskrigföring, Heickerö, pp 17, 29-30. 
35 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_78170.htm  
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and values ruling at the time being in these communities.36 These norms and values 
also differ from community to community. Internet has for quite some time become 
part of many peoples day-to-day life in many communities and it is hard to imagine 
that we would stop using it. Internet has changed our way of communicating and is 
part of globalisation. It has affected young generations and is now something that kids 
learn how to use at a young age.37 This means, as far as I believe, that the new 
generation in high technological countries will grow up considering Internet and 
computers as part of their daily life. The growing dependency on the Internet and 
computer networks, not necessarily connected to the Internet, for infrastructures, such 
as water distribution or electrical power transmission, will make societies more 
vulnerable for computer network attacks.38    
 
I believe that the growing dependency on the Internet and computer networks for 
societies will affect the way we see international law. When computer network attacks 
become more frequent between states, to paralyse or injure one another, there will 
soon have to be a decision about if a state can lawfully defend itself against a 
computer network attack. I believe this is also why a growing number of authors and 
experts are interested in the subject.   
 
Computer network attacks are new tools in modern warfare. Computer network 
attacks have existed for some time but were not specifically taken into consideration 
in the creation of, for example the UN Charter. This means that there are no specific 
laws in international law that are pointing out exactly how computer network attacks 
shall be handled or laws to fall back on saying that war can or cannot be started 
through or because of a computer network attack. This is not an entirely lawless legal 
area since there are principles, customary law and treaties that may be used for 
analogies.39 Treaties, such as the UN Charter, are regulating resort to force but are 
based and created on the thought that war takes place on land, at sea or in air. 
International law has not been fully able to keep up with the technological evolution. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Computer Network Attack and Use of Force in International Law, Schmitt, p 910. 
37 Färre svenskar skaffar Facebook, Karlsson, Göteborgs Posten, 2012-10-17 and Teknikfrälst 
innan han kan gå, Karlsson, Göteborgs Posten, 2012-10-17 and Svenskarna och Internet 2012, 
Findahl, p 6.  
38 Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War, Harrison Dinniss, p 5. 
39 Tallinn Manual, p 24, part A, para 2.	  
	   15	  
International law is unique in the way it is created. Sovereign states have to agree on 
laws they want to create and follow. This may be a time-consuming process, which 
sometimes may not even come to a final result. It is not guaranteed that new laws will 
be able to cover all the new technological aspects of the cyber domain even though 
laws are often generally constructed to be able to cover many different scenarios.  
 
The subject of computer network attacks in international law is relevant because of 
the discrepancy resulting from the lack of legal regulation and the fact that computer 
network attacks are already considered a method of warfare. Another verification of 
the legal issue concerning computer network attacks is that new literature is 
constantly written on the subject and that a group, put together by NATO, is working 
on a manual on cyber warfare.40    
 
3 Computer network attacks as an “armed attack” 
 
3.1 The concepts of “use of force” and “armed attack” in the UN Charter 
and customary international law   
 
To be able to compare a computer network attack with an “armed attack” I have to 
begin with discussing what is considered to be an “armed attack” in general. I also 
have to comment on the concept “use of force” to understand how these two concepts 
and international law have developed.  
 
Many authors,41 discussing computer network attacks in relation to international law, 
refer to the Charter of the United Nations and customary international law by building 
their argumentation around these laws and the concept “armed attack”. Why do so 
many authors refer to these sources? Melzer concludes that the UN Charter is 
considered to be one of the most important sources of international law in jus ad 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Tallinn Manual. 
41 See for example Nils Melzer, David E. Graham, Michael N. Schmitt, Heather Harrison 
Dinniss and Marco Roscini.	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bellum.42 This conclusion is probably the point of view of many educated women and 
men in international law.  
 
What can be of guidance is the Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons,43 especially 
the sequence where the ICJ discuss the relevant applicable law for the use of nuclear 
weapons:  
 
“ … the Court concludes that the most directly relevant applicable law 
governing the question of which it was seised, is that relating to the use of 
force enshrined in the United Nations Charter … ”.44  
 
A reason for why the ICJ comes to this conclusion may be that the ICJ is an 
institution of the United Nations. Although free to use other sources of law such as 
international customary law, the Charter is the keystone of the organisation of which 
the ICJ is part. However, it is still a fact that the Charter of the United Nations is one 
of the most accepted Charters regarding relations between states.  
 
International law is a kind of its own and its creation is different from that of national 
law. It rests on a belief that there is a common interest to follow the rules of 
international law and if there is no such interest there is no international law. There is 
no institution above sovereign states, which makes the enforcement process difficult. 
Questions that have ensued recently, for example about computer network attacks as 
part of warfare, will have to be discussed and developed in the international 
community for new international principles to be established through state practice, 
international jurisprudence and doctrine as well as international treaty law.45 Political 
interests can shape and affect the development of international law. There are few 
institutions where questions like these about computer network attacks carried out 
between states can be discussed and one of the few institutions that can give a 
judgment on the legal aspects is the ICJ.46  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Cyberwarfare and International Law, Melzer, p 6. 
43 Advisory Opinion on the Threat or use of Nuclear Weapons. 
44 Ibid., para 34. 
45 Cyberwarfare and International Law, Melzer, p 6. 
46 ICJ website and A/RES/42/22, 18 November 1987, General Assembly, article 32.	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One of the difficulties with international law governing resort to force is to find what 
is regarded as a legitimate or illegitimate use of force in the international society 
today. Part of this problem is that the “use of force” and “armed attack” are not 
defined in treaty law.47 There are two main bodies of international law regulating the 
use of force and armed attack, namely, international treaty law and customary 
international law. The main treaty on the subject is the Charter of the United Nations, 
especially article 2(4) and the concept “use of force”:  
 
“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.” 
 
As well as article 51 and the concept “armed attack”: 
 
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the 
exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any 
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.” 
 
The Charter does not specify what an “armed attack” is or when self-defence is 
considered to be lawful or unlawful more than in the case of that an armed attack 
occurs. Customary international law helps to clarify these concepts further. Here we 
find principles developed over time concerning the use of force and armed attacks that 
give guidance on how the concepts should be interpreted, for example state practice 
(usus) and opinio juris.48 Due to the special character of international law, what is a 
lawful resort to force can change over time by, for example state practice. There are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 The Law of Information Conflict, Wingfield, p 73. 
48 Ibid., p 73 and Nicaragua case, para 184.	  
	   18	  
rulings from the ICJ and doctrine on the subject that will be relevant to analyse 
further.49 
 
The prohibition of the use of force in the Charter of the United Nations expressed in 
article 2(4) can be seen as a codification of the principle considered as jus cogens in 
customary international law.50 When considering the concept of the use of force in the 
Charter scholars are discussing if the concept should be interpreted in a restrictive or 
permissive context.51  This discussion occurs, for example when new war technology 
is developed or when a state uses other means than armed force against another state. 
It is not certain if the wording of the Charter can cover new war technology or other 
means that are not directly identified as armed force. Some commentators argue for a 
more restrictive interpretation of the concept “use of force”, meaning that not every 
governmental interference of a state in another state should be covered by the 
concept, but foremost armed or military force.52 These commentators, for example, 
argue that economic coercion should not be covered by the use of force.53 Brownlie 
seems to draw the line at economic coercion but argues that operations with weapons 
that do not have a kinetic or similar effect might be seen as a use of force firstly, if the 
means are generally referred to as “weapons” or “warfare” and secondly, if they are 
used to destroy life or property. Schmitt acknowledges the second criterion. 54 
Brownlie gives examples of situations like releasing water with the risk to flood a 
valley or a village.55 On the other hand Brownlie also argues that the interpretation of 
the concept use of force does not have to be restrictive since the justification of the 
use of force only lies in the given exceptions in the Charter and therefore those are the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Statue of ICJ, article 38. 
50 Nicaragua case, para 190 with reference to the International Law Commission, (paragraph 
(1) of the commentary of the Commission to Article 50 of its draft Articles on the Law of 
Treaties, ILC Yearbook, 1966-11, p. 247). 
51 Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War, Harrison Dinniss, p 58. 
52 The Law of Information Conflict, Wingfield, p 87 and Cyberwarfare and International Law, 
Melzer, p 7. 
53 The Law of Information Conflict, Wingfield, pp 87-90 and Textbook on International Law, 
Dixon, p. 310 and Cyberwarfare and International Law, Melzer, p. 7 and International Law 
and the Use of Force by States, Brownlie, pp 362-363 and Warfare - Jus ad bellum and the 
Use of Cyber Force, Roscini, p 105. 
54 International Law and the Use of Force by States, Brownlie, pp 362-363 and ”Attack” as a 
Term of Art in International Law, Schmitt, p 288. 
55 International Law and the Use of Force by States, Brownlie, pp 362-363. 
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ones that need to be restrictively interpreted.56 Brownlie is therefore asking for a more 
restrictive interpretation of armed attack. Schmitt refers to a restrictive point of view 
where positivists argue that in accordance with the Vienna Convention: 
 
“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose.”57 
 
According to Schmitt the positivist believe that “force” in 2(4) means armed force 
interpreted in accordance with the preamble of the Charter that refers to “armed 
force”.58 Schmitt on the other hand refers to the positivist view of interpreting the 
Charter as failing to reflect the full purpose of the Charter,59 namely, maintaining 
international peace and security. The reason being that they do not reflect the reality 
of the world today where the threat to peace might lie in new technology rather than 
traditional weapons.60 However, in the end Schmitt comes to the conclusion that the 
restrictive approach is the strongest and that the use of force is commonly thought to 
include armed force and exclude economic coercion, but with this not saying that the 
use of force only means “armed force”.61 I understand the restrictive utilisation of the 
use of force as a way to protect it from being stretched to cover all types of attacks or 
interventions.62 It is a way to avoid undermining the concept and to only use it in the 
worst and most apparent cases.   
 
Other scholars advocate a wider or permitting interpretation of the concept use of 
force where it would be possible to consider also economic and similar interference as 
the use of force. Wingfield argues, contrary to other commentators, that the lack of 
the word “armed” in 2(4) means that also economic coercion can constitute a use of 
force and support his argument with the fact that the travaux préparatoires63 does not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 International Law and the Use of Force by States, Brownlie, pp 432-433. 
57 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 31(1). 
58 For further reading on this discussion see: Computer Network Attacks and the Use of Force 
in International Law, Schmitt. 
59 Charter of the United Nations, article 1. 
60 Computer Network Attack and Use of Force in International Law, Schmitt, pp 901-902. 
61 Ibid., p 908. 
62 Ibid., pp 928-929 footnote 123. 
63 Preparatory work of the UN Charter.	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state that the use of force should only be interpreted as armed force.64 For example, 
both Wingfield and Brownlie believe that the use of biological and chemical weapons 
can constitute a use of force and an armed attack.65 Schmitt refers to the expression 
“other manner” in 2(4) as covering all other forms of force.66 If these interpretations 
of the use of force are correct, it is proof of the international law’s ability to adjust to 
new types of weapons and warfare and that the interpretation of the use of force and 
armed attack matters in the development of international law on resort to force. The 
wider interpretation of the use of force can take into account changes of norms and 
values in the international society - norms and values that can have developed or 
changed over time, for example, because of technological evolution.  
 
What the restrictive and permissive proponents have in common is that many of them 
interpret the Charter with an instrument-based approach, meaning that the tool, either 
economic or armed force, is the relevant basis for interpretation of the use of force. 
The Instrument-based approach was used in 1945, which was logical at the time of 
creation of the Charter, as it was most likely that the use of force at the time would 
consist of armed force.67  Over time, development of technology etcetera has led to a 
discussion of the use of force mainly based on an effects-based approach, which will 
be discussed further below. 
 
In my understanding there is not yet a universal agreement on what the concept of use 
of force is meant to include or exclude. There are several indicative principles and 
many commentators have strong arguments on the interpretation in both a restrictive 
and permissive direction. This question will probably be discussed more in the future 
but I am not certain whether there will be a universal conclusion to the interpretation 
of the use of force. What is clearer to me, is the conclusion made by the ICJ in the 
Nicaragua case:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 The Law of Information Conflict, Wingfield, pp 88-89 and International Law and the Use 
of Force by States, Brownlie, p 362. 
65 International Law and the Use of Force by States, Brownlie, p 362 and The Law of 
Information Conflict, Wingfield, pp 112-113. 
66 Computer Network Attack and Use of Force in International Law, Schmitt, p 901. 
67 Ibid., p 909. 
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“The essential consideration is that both the Charter and the customary 
international law flow from a common fundamental principle outlawing the 
use of force in international relations.”68  
 
The ICJ has had an important role in the interpretation of the concepts of use of force 
and armed attack. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ concludes that it can apply 
customary international law norms independently from treaty norms with the same or 
similar content and that “ … customary international law continues to exist alongside 
treaty law”.69 The Court makes this statement because the U.S. argues that the UN 
Charter is a codification of customary international law and that customary 
international law should therefore not be applied, neither should treaty law because of 
a multilateral treaty reservation between Nicaragua and the U.S.70 The Court explains 
that the multilateral treaty reservation does not hinder the Court from applying 
customary international law. This because customary law does not cease to exist 
because of codification and the Court further determines that the wording in article 51 
of the Charter regarding “inherent right” to self-defence refers to a right in accordance 
with customary international law.71 When discussing the “inherent” right to self-
defence, the Court states that:  
  
“ … the Charter, having itself recognized the existence of this right, does not 
go on to regulate directly all aspects of its content. For example, it does not 
contain any specific rule whereby self-defence would warrant only measures 
which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a 
rule well established in customary international law.”72 (Emphasis added).  
  
This is strong proof that there are differences in the two bodies of law and that the 
interpretation of the concepts use of force and armed attack not necessarily have 
exactly the same contents in both international customary and treaty law.  The Court’s 
statement shows, in my opinion, that the customary international law and the 
international treaty law are two different bodies of law independently applicable to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Nicaragua case, para 181. 
69 Ibid., para 176. 
70 Ibid., para 172 -176.  
71 Ibid., para 176 and 193. 
72 Ibid., para 176.	  
	   22	  
disputes of international law even though they may sometimes have the same or 
similar contents. The Court makes a similar statement in the Congo v. Uganda case 
where it clarifies that the provisions of the Declaration on Friendly Relations “ … are 
declaratory of customary international law”.73  
 
Also the Security Council of the United Nations separates customary and treaty law 
and an example of this is found when the Security Council unanimously condemns 
the Israeli military attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor Osirak as “ … in clear violation 
of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct … ”.74 A 
treaty or a resolution may be seen as a codification of customary international law 
norms but the codification as such does not exclude the possibility to apply the norms 
of the customary international law independently.  
 
In the Nicaragua case, the Court continues by saying that one way of defining a 
principle of customary international law, such as the principle of prohibition of the 
use of force, as opinio juris is by the consent of states to resolutions of the General 
Assembly of the UN, such as the Declaration of Friendly Relations75.76 The principle 
of non-use of force in customary international law can therefore be used, 
independently from the Charter of the United Nations, as a source of international 
law. A conclusion I have drawn from this is that even though a principle has been 
codified in a resolution or treaty it does not lose its power as an independent principle 
of international law and the codification itself can instead be proof of the general 
acceptance of this principle as opinio juris. It might be important to define customary 
international law and treaty law as two different bodies of law as there might be 
differences in the outcome of the analysis of the two. This distinction is important in 
order to be able to analyse if it is possible to define a computer network attack as an 
armed attack under one, neither or both bodies of law.  
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Concerning the concept of “armed attack” found in article 51 of the Charter there is 
no precise definition of the concept.77 The ICJ itself expresses this in the Nicaragua 
case:  
 
“ … a definition of the ‘armed attack’ which, if found to exist, authorizes the 
exercise of the ‘inherent right’ of self-defence, is not provided in the Charter, 
and is not part of treaty law.”78 (Emphasis added). 
 
A few paragraphs later the Court states that there is a general agreement on acts that 
can constitute an armed attack referring to the resolution on Definition of Aggression, 
which will be discussed further below.79 Apparently a definition of the concept of 
armed attack is discussable. In a dictionary the term “armed” is defined as: 
”Furnished with arms or armour; fully equipped for war”80 or “using or carrying 
weapons”.81 These are only suggested definitions but they do not help clarifying the 
concept of armed attack in any further extent. 
 
However, the ICJ defines a difference between the use of force and an armed attack in 
the Nicaragua case by saying that an armed attack constitutes “ … the most grave 
forms of the use of force … ”82 and that an act has to be of “ … such gravity as to 
amount to’ (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces … 
”83(emphasis added). Later in the judgement the ICJ concludes that: 
 
“While an armed attack would give rise to an entitlement to collective self-
defence, a use of force of a lesser degree of gravity cannot … produce any 
entitlement to take collective counter- measures involving the use of force.”84 
(Emphasis added). 
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79 Ibid., para 195. 
80 Oxford English Dictionary.  
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This conclusion is also acknowledged by Wingfield stating that the interpretation of 
the concept of armed attack is more restrictive than that of the use of force,85 while 
Schmitt believes that the use of force is to be found between economic coercion and 
armed force.86  
 
Further, the Court explains that an attack has to reach a certain level of scale and 
effects to be considered as an armed attack, this in comparison to “ … a mere frontier 
incident … ” 87 that may reach the level of intervention. The scale and effects criteria 
are in the Nicaragua case applied to a situation where an act is carried out by armed 
bands or irregulars, but as long as this act:  
 
“ … because of its scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed 
attack rather than as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by regular 
armed forces.”88 (Emphasis added).   
 
The Court does not clearly make out the difference between when an act constitutes 
an “intervention”, a “use of force” or an “armed attack”, but points out the two criteria 
as guidance. A clearer line would have been preferable, since acts that constitute an 
armed attack, are followed by the right to use force in self-defence while interventions 
are not. What is clear is that the Court concludes that the concept of “armed attack” 
exists, not only in the Charter, but also in customary international law.89 
 
Brownlie believes that the use of force needs to be of a certain gravity to be 
differentiated from “frontier incidents” but that the more important question is if there 
was “intent” to attack.90 The intent or objective of an act may, beside the criterion of 
gravity, also be considered as criterion for deciding if an act is an armed attack. In 
addition to this both Wingfield and Graham have put forward “scope, duration and 
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intensity” as criteria to define armed attack, although Wingfield states that these 
criteria can also be used to define the use of force.91  
 
The ICJ statement that a principle of customary international law expressed in a 
resolution from the General Assembly could be considered, as opinio juris, must,92 in 
my opinion, also be applicable to the Declaration on the Definition of Aggression.93 
The Court points out that the declaration reflects customary international law.94 
However, it is interesting to note that Schmitt finds it “suspect” that the Court refers 
to non-binding General Assembly resolutions as proof of opinio juris.95  
 
According to article 1 of the resolution an “aggression” is the use of armed force from 
one state against another. What complicates the utilization of the resolution is that it 
aims only at defining the concept “aggression”, used in article 39 of the Charter, 
which gives the Security Council right to take measures if it identifies a threat to or 
breach of the peace or an act of aggression. One of the main purposes of the 
resolution is that the General Assembly: 
 
“Calls the attention of the Security Council to the Definition of Aggression, as 
set out below, and recommends that it should, as appropriate, take account of 
that Definition as guidance in determination, in accordance with the Charter, 
the existence of an act of aggression.”96 
 
The resolution does not literally aim at defining the concepts “use of force” or “armed 
attack” in 2(4) or 51 of the Charter and not once in the document is the concept of 
“armed attack”, mentioned. According to article 2 together with article 3 of the 
resolution, it covers also use of armed force that does not reach “sufficient gravity”. I 
believe that this wording aims at covering also acts of armed force, which are not of 
such gravity to reach the level of armed attack, but are acts that reach the level of 
being a threat or breach of the peace, which will enable the Security Council to take 	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measures. According to Graham the resolution does not give an exact answer as to 
what constitutes an armed attack, however it does give examples of “ … state actions 
that are deemed to qualify as such [armed attack], and these have gained extensive 
international acceptance”.97 
   
I do not fully agree with Graham in his analysis. The Definition of Aggression aims 
at, as its title indicates, giving a definition of aggression and therefore also includes 
acts that do not reach a level of an armed attack. The Court confirms that the acts 
referred to in article 3(g) of the Definition of Aggression, such as sending of armed 
bands or irregulars, can constitute an armed attack, under customary international 
law.98 Although I agree that the resolution can of course be of guidance, to identify an 
armed attack, it does not give a clear difference between a situation considered as an 
armed attack or an act of aggression. Such a definition would be desirable as it is 
when an armed attack occurs that states have the right to self-defence while an act of 
aggression allows for the Security Council to take measures.  
 
An interesting reflection is that the French version of the declaration is called 
“Définition d’agression” and that the French version of the Charter’s article 51 refers 
to “agression armée” as for the English “armed attack”. I am neither an English nor 
French native speaker, however there appears to be a slight difference in the English 
versions’ use of “aggression” and “armed attack”, at least that it could be subject for 
argumentation. This is avoided in the French versions by using the same wording in 
the declaration and articles of the Charter.   
 
As previously mentioned99 the Charter allows an inherent right to self-defence, which 
by some has been interpreted as referring to a right developed in customary law that 
has been acknowledged in the Charter.100 As the ICJ points out the French version of 
article 51 refers to a “droit naturel” (natural right), which implies that the right to self-
defence existed before the Charter was written. 101  However, proponents of a 
restrictive interpretation argue that the right to self-defence now applies only to 	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member states being the victim of an armed attack.102 While the wording of article 51 
states that the right to self-defence arises when an armed attack “occurs” the 
customary international law goes beyond that and gives guiding principles about the 
lawfulness of self-defence.103       
 
Old principles formulated in the Caroline case104 suggest that the right to self-defence 
only arises when “ … ‘necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and 
leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation’”.105 This is more 
commonly expressed as that an imminent threat must be at hand.106 This is part of the 
discussion in international law about anticipatory self-defence concerning if self-
defence can be lawful not only as “preventive” but also “pre-emptive” self-defence.107 
It is not agreed upon at what moment self-defence is lawful and there are authors 
proposing that self-defence might be launched in advance of an armed attack occurs 
and others saying that this is an unlawful use of force.108 Among the authors 
proponents of anticipatory self-defence there are different opinions on how far the 
right can be extended in advance of the armed attack.109 110 
 
Other principles developed in customary international law are the principles of  
“necessity” and “proportionality” regulating the lawful use of force - self-defence.111 
The principle of necessity requires that the use of force in self-defence “ … be needed 
to successfully repel an imminent attack or defeat one that is under way.” 112 seen 	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from the victim’s point of view. Proportionality “ … limits the scale, scope, duration, 
and intensity of the defensive response to that required to end the situation that has 
given rise to the right to act in self-defence.”113 The use of force does not have to be 
of the same type as the attack. The requirement of necessity and proportionality of 
lawful self-defence is acknowledged in the Corfu Channel case, the Nicaragua case, 
Oil Platforms case and in the Congo v. Uganda case as well as in the Advisory 
Opinion on the use of Nuclear Weapons.114 In the Nicaragua case the Court points out 
both the principles and that these are to be applied in addition to the Charter:  
 
“ … the Charter, having itself recognized the existence of this right, does not 
go on to regulate directly all aspects of its content. For example, it does not 
contain any specific rule whereby self-defence would warrant only measures 
which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a  
rule well established in customary international law.”115 (Emphasis added). 
 
All these principles provide guidance for defining an armed attack but there is still no 
clear definition. In resolutions from the Security Council the Council declares that a 
state is the object of an armed attack but does not clarify when or how the attacks 
reached the level of an armed attack.116 Wingfield suggests that the period of time and 
intensity must be of importance and also suggests that the requirement of necessity 
and proportionality is applicable to all the use of force and that states can use 
necessary and proportional force as a response to a use of force not amounting to an 
armed attack, although maybe not self-defence amounting to a level of armed force.117 
Others, on the other hand, propose that the use of force in self-defence is strictly 
associated with the occurrence of an armed attack. Wingfield claims that the victim-
state in that case only has ineffective means of response against the use of force from 
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the other state and that the commentators often cannot argue in a satisfactory way in 
favour of their positioning.118     
 
To briefly summarise the analysis above - the UN Charter and customary 
international law are two different bodies of law governing resort to force and the 
concepts of use of force and armed attack exist in both of them. Even though the 
content of the concepts may be similar in both bodies of law there might be 
differences nonetheless. While the Charter is applicable to the states that are members 
of the UN, customary international law is applicable to those, which are not members. 
However, principles of customary law, not codified in the Charter, are applicable to 
all states.  
 
In regard to the use of force the most central question is if the concept should be 
interpreted in a restrictive or permissive way and if the term covers only armed force 
or if other forms of force are included as well, for example economic coercion. Even 
though there is no clear definition of the concept of armed attack a few criteria put 
forward to decide if an act is an armed attack are: scale and effect, sufficient gravity, 
intention and scope, duration and intensity. Means referred to as weapons or warfare 
can also serve as criteria. 
 
Interpretation of the concepts use of force and armed attack can be based on both an 
instrument-based and an effects-based approach. Examples of effects are fatalities or 
large-scale destruction of property. There are examples of other forms of force that 
generally are considered to be able to amount to an armed attack, namely biological 
and chemical weapons. The ability to apply the concepts use of force and armed 
attack to such means shows the international law’s ability to adjust to new types of 
warfare and that law governing resort to force has an ability to develop over time. 
 
According to customary international law a threat must be imminent for the right to 
self-defence to be used in anticipation of an armed attack and the self-defence must be 
necessary and proportionate.     
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After this general overview of the concepts of use of force and armed attack I will 
now turn to the question if these concepts can be applied to computer network attacks.   
 
3.2 Computer network attacks as an “armed attack” in the UN Charter 
and customary international law 
 
The main question of this paper is to analyse arguments in favour of and against the 
application of the concept of “armed attack” in the UN Charter and customary 
international law to computer network attacks. I will therefore below analyse a few 
relevant sources.  
 
The suggestion that a computer network attack might be seen as a breach of the 
principle of “non-intervention” in a state’s internal or external affairs, recognised in 
the Charter of the United Nations, the General Assembly’s Declaration on 
Inadmissibility of Intervention and customary international law, is not too difficult to 
agree on.119 However, a breach against this principle is not followed by a right to 
armed self-defence, for the victim-state, according to international law. A breach of 
the principle of non-use of force, on the other hand, is for the victim-state followed by 
a right to self-defence if an armed attack occurs, according to article 51 in the UN 
Charter and customary international law.120 This might be one of the reasons why 
some authors and states advocate that a computer network attack could possibly be 
comparable to an armed attack.  
 
The phenomenon of computer network attacks shares a few similarities with nuclear 
weapons. Nuclear weapons were weapons of new technology with powers beyond the 
weapons already known of, at the time, and that changed the terms of warfare. 
Perhaps can the conclusion, given by the ICJ in the Advisory Opinion on Nuclear 
Weapons, referred to above,121 stating that the UN Charter is the most relevant 
applicable law concerning use of nuclear weapons, also be applicable to computer 	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network attacks. If the Charter is applicable to nuclear weapons then perhaps it is also 
applicable to computer network attacks due to the similarities just mentioned, and if 
not directly applicable, it may at least be of guidance.     
 
In the Advisory Opinion, the ICJ concludes that no rule specifically prohibits or 
authorizes the threat or use of nuclear weapons in international customary or treaty 
law.122 In paragraph 39 of the Advisory Opinion the Court clarifies that the articles 
regarding the use of force and armed attack of the Charter of the United Nations are 
not specifying what kind of weapon must be used to be applicable. According to 
Roscini, the airplanes used in the attack against the U.S. on September 11, 2001, must 
have been considered as weapons, since the Security Council in two resolutions123 
following the attacks, recognized and reaffirmed the inherent right to self-defence in 
accordance with the Charter.124 Computer network attacks constitute a great example 
of when the wording of the Charter becomes subject for discussion. Even though, at 
the time of creation, the intention of the wording of the Charter was clear,125 it is not 
clear today.  
 
Roscini is of the opinion that weapons do not have to have kinetic effect and is certain 
that, for example biological weapons, are covered by 2(4) and refers to the Nicaragua 
case and the Court’s conclusion that arming and training the Contras was to be seen 
as a use of force.126 According to Wingfield commentators from both the restrictive 
and emancipated interpretation of when a use of force as self-defence is lawful have 
interpreted “armed force” as also including “ … non-military physical force and 
indirect force … ”.127 In the Tallinn Manual it is expressed that the weapon employed 
is not a decisive matter and that it is state practice that the use of biological weapons 
can amount to an armed attack. According to the experts of the manual the same 
arguments are applicable to computer network attacks.128  
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At the time being computer network attacks are not mentioned in the non-exhaustive 
list in article 3 of the Declaration on Definition of Aggression, but according to article 
4, the Security Council may determine that other acts can constitute aggression under 
the provisions of the Charter. However, it is probable that a computer network attack 
could amount to the level of an aggression followed by the right for the Security 
Council to take measures according to the statement in the Definition of Aggression 
article 3(b), saying that an aggression is the use of any weapons against the territory 
of another state (as also pointed out in the Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons). 
The group of experts of the Tallinn Manual have agreed that this is an expression of 
customary international law and that computer network attacks can constitute a use of 
force. The fact alone that a computer is used for launching the attack is not a relevant 
fact.129 As long as the computer network attack is directed at another state and is 
directed at the territory of that state it can constitute an act of aggression. There has to 
be a cross border incident and as concluded in the Tallinn Manual computer network 
attacks sent from one state to another that reach the level of armed attack, fulfil this 
criterion. If the attack is sent from within the same state’s territory it is instead a 
matter of national law.130  
 
The type of weapon employed in an attack does not appear to be of great importance 
when deciding if a computer network attack can constitute an armed attack and as the 
cross-border criterion is fulfilled, if the attack is sent from one state to another, the 
issue is to know when or how the act reaches the level of an armed attack. As 
mentioned above much of the argumentation on the use of force and armed attack has 
previously focused on an instrument-based approach where the tool used, either 
economic or armed force, was in centre of discussion. However, now it appears more 
important to consider an effects-based approach, where the effect rather than the tool 
is important. As Schmitt concludes the international law is shaped and affected by the 
ruling norms of societies and the global community.131 The Charter was constructed 
in the perspective of the existing norms at the time and it will be interpreted in 
relation to existing norms today.  
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Jurisprudence from the ICJ is seen as part of the international law governing jus ad 
bellum and it is natural that principles pointed out in the Court’s judgments are 
applied by authors, discussing computer network attacks as part of warfare. The 
effects-based approach might be derived from the principles pointed out by the ICJ 
about scale and effects in the Nicaragua case to define an attack as an armed attack if 
carried out by non-regular forces.132 The situation resembles a possible computer 
network attack, because computer network attacks are not performed by the sending 
of regular forces but rather by cyber commands, probably situated far from where the 
attacks have effect.  
 
This might be part of the answer to the question why it is necessary to compare the 
effects of a computer network attack with the effect of a bomb or other weapons with 
kinetic effect. Melzer considers it uncontroversial that a computer network attack can 
be equated with a use of force when the effects are on the same level as attacks of 
kinetic or similar force.133 As discussed above, some authors support the restrictive 
interpretation of the concepts use of force and armed attack and refer to the travaux 
préparatoires of the Charter of the United Nations, considering that, for example 
economic coercion is not included in the concept of use of force.134 Although 
Brownlie agrees on this, he also considers it possible that the travaux préparatoires 
did not exclude “ … force other than armed force … ”135 from being included in the 
concept use of force and he believes that it is necessary to decide if the use of 
weapons without kinetic or similar effect will be defined as a use of force, for 
example biological and chemical weapons.136 Zemanek argues that it is a matter of 
result, for example fatalities or large-scale destruction of property that distinguishes 
an armed attack from other attacks.137 Dinstein also has a results-based approach to 
the question if a computer network attack may be seen as an armed attack.138 
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Using the argument of scale and effects as criteria can be a way to make computer 
network attacks come closer to the concepts use of force and armed attack and the 
interpretation that the concepts only contain military or armed force because of the 
similar physical effects, instead of being compared to economic coercion without 
obvious physical effects. Schmitt has developed a test with 6 criteria for 
differentiating acts of the use of force from economic coercion, which could be 
useful. Especially since the experts of the Tallinn Manual have come to consensus 
about that economic coercion cannot constitute a use of force. The adjusted criteria 
are now incorporated in the Manual.139   
 
It is worthwhile to note that the experts of the Tallinn Manual also classify scale and 
effect as criteria useable for determining if a computer network attack can constitute a 
use of force.140 It is also expressed in the Tallinn Manual that considering computer 
network attacks as possibly amounting to an armed attack and a use of force, 
depending on its scale and effects, is in line with both the Charter and customary 
international law.141 However, even though effect can serve as a criterion, it is still 
preferable to analyse every case separately and to see to the, as Schmitt describes it, “ 
… qualitative nature of an action’s consequences … ” rather than specifying general 
conditions for measuring the effect (Schmitt- quantitative standards).142 
 
It is hard to foresee all possible effects caused by a computer network attack but still 
the experts of the Manual agreed that only foreseeable effects would serve as 
fulfilling the criterion of effects.143 A computer worm might be programmed to 
change the normal functions of a program but if the worm escapes to another 
program, network or computer, for example via Internet or by someone spreading it 
purposely, the effects might be graver than the attacker had planned in the first place. 
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An example is the Stuxnet worm, which was spread over the Internet, which led to it 
being exposed.144  
 
There is consensus among experts of the Tallinn Manual that computer network 
attacks can constitute an armed attack and the relevant criteria to decide when these 
acts amount to armed attack are scale and foreseeable effects.145 What the experts ask 
themselves is if a number of computer network attacks, not individually reaching the 
level of an armed attack, but accumulated can constitute an armed attack.146 Their 
answer is yes, a fact that is interesting put in relation to the information shared in an 
article on the Iranian cyber-threat.147 In the article a massive disturbance attack on 
U.S. banks’ websites is attributed to Iran with “ … mounting belief -- if not direct 
evidence … ”148 and the author cites Leon Panetta, Secretary of Defense (U.S.), 
saying that “ … United States reserves the right to respond to a cyberattack with 
‘kinetic force’”.149 The last phrase of the article is a question “ … how far will the 
U.S. let them keep going forward before this becomes a declaration of war?’”.150 The 
question seems just, after the conclusion made by the experts of the Tallinn Manual 
that many attacks accumulated can constitute an armed attack. It is the victim-state, 
which has the burden of proof that it is under an armed attack and that the self-
defence is lawful.151 As stated in the Nicaragua case “ … it is the State which is the 
victim of an armed attack which must form and declare the view that it has been so 
attacked.”152 Likewise, Iran declared that it was under attack when the Stuxnet worm 
became known.153 This shows how urgent it is to find a solution in the international 
community to the question on how to handle computer network attacks. 
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Another possible comparison with the Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons can be 
made with the discussion in paragraph 47 where the ICJ clarifies that if a use of a 
weapon is unlawful, the threat of the use of such a weapon is also unlawful. This is 
acknowledged in the Tallinn Manual.154 This could be put in contrast with the fact 
that it has been discussed in the U.S. if U.S. officials should make public 
announcements about development of offensive cyber weapons.155 In an article it is 
mentioned that if the U.S. declares that it has offensive cyber weapons it could lead to 
an arms race on cyber weapons.156 Such an arms race would in itself be contrary to 
the purpose of the Declaration on the Non-Use of Force,157 especially articles 19 and 
20 demanding that states should prevent arms race and contribute to relaxation of 
international tension. On the other hand, such a public discussion about cyber 
capabilities may lead to an international discussion on how the international 
community should handle computer network attacks in the perspective of 
international law.  
      
As mentioned above,158 Brownlie has expressed that if computer network attacks are 
commonly referred to as types of “weapons” and “warfare”, this serves as one 
criterion for considering computer network attacks as a use of force and in the long 
run perhaps as an armed attack. Brownlie’s second criterion is that if computer 
network attacks can destroy life and property they should be considered as a use of 
force. Roscini believes that a computer network attack can be equated with a use of 
force and that large-scale computer network attacks can amount to an armed attack. 
His main argument is that since the Charter and customary international law can cover 
nuclear weapons, they are flexible enough to cover also computer network attacks.159 
Schmitt believes that a computer network attack can possibly constitute an armed 
attack if it results in fatalities or that property is destroyed at a large scale.160 Roscini 
refers to Brownlie’s criteria and is convinced that both these criteria fit computer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Tallinn Manual, Chapter II, Section 1, Rule 12 commentaries. 
155 U.S. Suspects Iran Was Behind a Wave of Cyberattacks, Shanker and Sanger, The New 
York Times, October 13, 2012. 
156 Cyberwarfare Emerges From Shadows for Public Discussion by U.S. Officials, Shane, The 
New York Times, September 26, 2012. 
157 General Assembly Resolution A/RES/42/22.  
158 See footnote 54. 
159 World Wide Warfare - Jus ad bellum and the Use of Cyber Force, Roscini, p 130. 
160 Computer Network Attack and Use of Force in International Law, Schmitt, p 934.	  
	   37	  
network attacks well, especially associating this kind of attack with a new form of 
warfare or weapons. I have found that a few authors in the daily press already refer to 
computer network attacks as warfare and weapons and perhaps is this criterion for 
defining a new technology as a use of force or an armed attack already fulfilled.161  
 
So far, I have found that Roscini is the sole author agreeing with Brownlie that 
referring to computer network attacks as weapons and warfare is a suitable criterion, 
admitting that my research is of limited scale. Computer network attacks can, in my 
opinion, possibly fit into both of Brownlie’s criteria depending on the type of attack. 
Apparently, these attacks are already referred to as weapons and part of warfare162 
and may result in destruction of property (for example the destruction of centrifuges 
in the Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities because of Stuxnet)163 and may cause 
death if, for example, disrupting systems controlling traffic lights or air traffic. The 
experts of the Tallinn Manual have expressed that the object targeted of the attack 
serves as criterion for defining a computer network attack as an armed attack. If the 
objects are humans or property the attack is an armed attack if, at the same time, the 
scale and effects criteria are fulfilled and the act is a trans-border operation.164   
 
As mentioned above165 “scope”, “duration” and “intensity” were pointed out as 
criteria to define an armed attack. According to Graham these criteria can be used 
together with three different approaches (effects-based, instrument-based or “strict 
liability”) to define an armed attack. Graham refers to the effects-based approach or 
consequence-based approach as the approach used by the U.S. and continues by 
concluding that proponents of the three different approaches agree that a “cyber 
attack” can be seen as an armed attack.166 Wingfield gives an example where one state 
completely cuts of the telecommunications of another state through a computer 	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network attack and refers to this as the “ … electronic equivalent of an armed attack 
… ”.167  Wingfield also applies the criteria of scope, duration and intensity by 
exemplifying that computer network attacks causing repeated train crashes or one 
significant attack paralyzing the stock exchange for a considerable time would 
amount to an armed attack with a following right to self-defence.168 Opposing, some 
of the experts of the Tallinn Manual do not find the latter computer network attack as 
constituting an armed attack because they do not consider such a financial loss as 
destruction of property.169 
 
Zemanek, to whom Roscini refers, believes that it is not the question about what type 
of weapon that matters, but the question of intent and result.170 Roscini states that the 
attacker must have intention to harm the victim.171 Schmitt concludes that computer 
network attacks that destroy property or result in fatalities and were sent with 
intention to do so will probably be seen as an armed attack. He identifies a more 
difficult question on how to handle computer network attacks that do not cause 
fatalities or destroy property.172 Although a few of the Tallinn Manual experts 
consider intention as a criterion for deciding if a computer network attack can 
constitute an armed attack the majority of experts does not consider intention 
relevant.173 It appears that there is no general consensus regarding intention as 
criterion for deciding if a computer network attack can constitute an armed attack.  
 
Can we already talk about opinio juris or usus regarding computer network attacks in 
international law? In the Nicaragua case the ICJ discusses how customary 
international law is created, when trying to determine if there is customary law 
regarding counter-measures against intervention. The Court expresses an opinion that 
states do not have to follow rules strictly, but they should in their practice at least act 
in accordance with the rule, for the rule to be seen as a customary rule. Moreover, it is 	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the Court’s opinion that as long as states in general act in consistency with a rule, an 
act inconsistent with the same rule should be seen as a breach of the rule and not as a 
change of, or a new rule.174 Applied to computer network attacks these statements 
from the ICJ might show that even though a few states act as and proclaim that 
computer network attacks, according to them, should be seen as an armed attack, it is 
not certain that the ICJ would consider it as a change of or a new rule of customary 
international law.      
 
Schmitt states that there is neither opinio juris nor state practice yet regarding 
computer network attacks as an armed attack or a use of force.175 What should be 
taken into consideration is that Schmitt’s essay was written 1999 and a lot has 
happened since then. The most recent text on the subject mentions that opinio juris 
regarding computer network attacks is scarce and that state practice is not yet well 
developed.176 Roscini refers to D’Amato who said that by now computer network 
attacks would be prohibited in customary international law.177 Also Roscini is of a 
different opinion than Schmitt. Roscini means that usus can be expressed not only 
through “physical” state practice but also through verbal acts such as statements of 
various kinds and that new rules of customary international law can develop over a 
short period of time.178 The ICJ confirms in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases that 
time is not a single matter, for determining if there is state practice, stating as follows:  
 
“ … an indispensable requirement would be that within the period in question, 
short though it might be, State practice, including that of States whose 
interests are specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually 
uniform in the sense of the provision invoked;- and should moreover have 
occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or 
legal obligation is involved.”179(Emphasis added). 
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There are signs that, put together, might be indicating on a process of how computer 
network attacks should be handled. Slowly states are positioning themselves, for 
example by making cyber warfare part of their military strategies, as Canada, U.S., 
Russia and United Kingdom have done.180 Documents and regulations are pointing 
out how nations or groups of nations should act facing computer network attacks. For 
example, the cyber strategy of NATO,181 or that the U.S. has in the Nuclear Posture 
Review declared that “ … These forces are enabled by U.S. capabilities to protect its 
assets in cyberspace and outer space … ”.182 The fact that the U.S., since 2010, has a 
cyber command indicates that the U.S. is preparing for cyber war. Other states that 
have cyber units as part of their armies are China, Germany, Iran and Israel.183 The 
Russian military has expressed that it will consider computer network attacks on the 
Russian Federation as military means. 184  Also Sweden is developing a cyber 
command that will be ready for operative function next year.185 Roscini uses this as 
proof that these states consider the use of computer network attacks as possibly 
breaching the prohibition of use of force.186 The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties mentions that practice can be considered when interpreting, for example the 
UN Charter and the concept of armed attack.187 These are all signs that state practice 
is being developed and it is foremost states, that have the capabilities of engaging in a 
computer network attack, that are relevant to consider to find state practice,188 as 
pointed out in the citation just above (specially affected). However, in the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries case the Court states that even though a few states have adopted 
a rule, it will not for sure be seen as a rule of international law if other states have 
adopted another rule.189 
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The number of states does not matter according to Cassese, concluding that only two 
countries (the U.S. and USSR) constructed state practice for outer space, and this in a 
short period of time.190 The U.S. is one of the states that already has, in many ways 
declared its point of view concerning computer network attacks and will probably 
play an important role in the development of state practice.191 A reason for this might 
be, in my opinion, that the U.S. is aware of its status as one of the leading states in 
cyber technology and that, at an early stage, it wants to be part of developing 
customary international law regarding computer network attacks in the direction 
preferable for the U.S. – in order to be able to defend itself against computer network 
attacks.    
 
For an act to be seen as opinio juris the ICJ describes that it is not sufficient with only 
state practice but it is also needed that states believe that they are bound to act this 
way.192 In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases the Court concludes that:  
 
“ …	  in order to achieve this result, two conditions must be fulfilled. Not only 
must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be 
such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this 
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. 
The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is 
implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis. The States 
concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a 
legal obligation. The frequency, or even habitual character of the acts is not in 
itself enough.”193  
 
As both Schmitt and the other authors of the Tallinn Manual conclude opinio juris on 
computer network attacks is not yet well developed and I find it hard to say if any 
state yet believes that it is conforming to a legal obligation regarding considering 
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computer network attacks as an armed attack. This question will probably be 
discussed more in the near future. 
 
Above194 I have referred to the Caroline case in the aspect of when the right to self-
defence arises and that the victim must face an imminent threat to lawfully defend 
oneself in anticipation of an armed attack. Brownlie states that since the invention of 
long-range missiles “ … the difference between attack and imminent attack may now 
be negligible … ”.195 This can be compared to the instant set off of a computer 
network attack. There is not much time for a reaction in anticipatory self-defence. In 
an article, published in the New York Times, U.S.’s Defense Secretary Leon E. 
Panetta was referred to have said, in a speech about the U.S. cyber capabilities that:  
 
“‘If we detect an imminent threat of attack that will cause significant, physical 
destruction in the United States or kill American citizens, we need to have the 
option to take action against those who would attack us to defend this nation 
when directed by the president. For these kinds of scenarios, the department 
has developed that capability to conduct effective operations to counter threats 
to our national interests in cyberspace.’”196 (Emphasis added).  
 
I do not believe that it is a coincidence that Mr Panetta uses the word imminent in his 
speech when talking about the cyber threat against U.S., in my opinion, this is a way 
to implement the thought that this kind of threat is a serious and real threat that the 
U.S. must be able to defend itself from.  
 
In the Nicaragua case the court makes an interesting statement while discussing if 
there is a similar right to self-defence in case of an unlawful intervention as in the 
case of an armed attack:  
 
“… under international law in force today - whether customary international 
law or that of the United Nations system - States do not have a right of 	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‘collective’ armed response to acts which do not constitute an ‘armed 
attack’.”197(Emphasis added). 
 
This statement from the Court might, in my opinion, be a strong reason for why many 
authors are proponents to that computer network attacks should possibly be 
considered as armed attack in article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and 
customary international law. The Court refers to the “collective” right to self-defence 
but it is not meant to be any difference in the sense of the right to collective or 
individual self-defence. If the criterion to defend oneself with armed response is that 
the attack needs to be considered as an armed attack, it is not hard to understand that 
states that believe they face computer network attacks, of great sophistication and 
with devastating effects, have an interest in defending themselves in any way 
possible, including with armed force. It will, for these states, be necessary to convince 
the international community that computer network attacks must be considered as 
armed attack if they want to be able to defend themselves, in accordance with 
international law.   
 
As Melzer points out the purpose of the Charter of the United Nations is to keep the 
peace and security and I can agree with him that it would be unsatisfactory if states 
can avoid the prohibition of the use of force in the Charter by using means, having the 
same effects as armed force, but not falling under the wording of the Charter because 
of its new technology and not being defined as armed attack in a traditional 
meaning.198 Before summarizing my conclusions I would like to point out some 
potential consequences of considering a computer network attack as an armed attack.  
 
 
3.3 Consequences   
 
The primary consequence of defining a computer network attack as an armed attack is 
that the right to self-defence with use of force arises. The self-defence must follow the 
principles of necessity and proportionality established in customary international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Nicaragua case, para 211. 
198 Cyberwarfare and International Law, Melzer, p 8. 
	   44	  
law.199 However, the self-defence does probably not have to be of the same kind, as 
that of the attack. Kinetic force can be used in self-defence against a computer 
network attack and vice versa.200 The experts of the Tallinn Manual agreed that the 
victim of a computer network attack that amounts to an armed attack will have the 
right to use force in self-defence, those which are members of the Charter, according 
to the Charter and non-members according to customary international law.201 
 
The threat must be imminent in order for the self-defence to be launched in 
anticipation of a computer network attack considered as an armed attack.202 The 
majority of the experts of the Tallinn Manual concludes that time is not the relevant 
factor to decide if self-defence in anticipation of an imminent attack is justifiable, but 
the fact that a failure to act may result in loss of opportunity to act in self-defence for 
the victim-state.203 A requirement of immediacy is put forward by the experts of the 
Tallinn Manual to distinguish self-defence from retaliation. The latter is not accepted 
in customary international law and a distinction is therefore necessary. Immediacy 
refers to an on-going attack or when further attacks are expected to follow.204 The 
question of imminence and immediacy is relevant to computer network attacks due to 
the fact that the time for the sending of a computer network attack is almost negligible 
and the victim might not even be aware of the reason causing damage to its property 
or from where the attack originates. The attack must generally be attributable to a 
state for a right to self-defence. 
 
What are the consequences of basing the decision on if a computer network attack can 
be seen as an armed attack on an effects-based approach? Schmitt, referring to the 
effects as a consequence-based approach, believes that such an approach will 
constitute a new normative standard that will be difficult for the international 
community to adopt, according to Harrison Dinniss.205 Schmitt states that “ … it 
would prove extraordinarily difficult to quantify or qualify consequences in a 	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normatively practical manner”.206 I believe that Schmitt is expressing hesitation 
toward using a consequence- or effects-based approach because there will still be no 
clear definition of effect and it will be difficult to draw the line between effects that 
reach the level comparable to an armed attack and effects that do not. There will still 
be a grey zone. As Schmitt states:  
 
“It eases the evaluative process by simply asking whether force has been used, 
rather than requiring a far more difficult assessment of the consequences that 
have resulted.”207    
 
For example the effects of the Stuxnet worm were said to be a “slow down” of the 
Iranian nuclear enrichment program, which was said to be set back by 18 months, and 
that Iran had to change approximately 1000 IR-1 centrifuges because the worm was 
programmed to change the speed of the rotation of the centrifuges, which was causing 
damage to them.208 If this attack could be attributed to a state, would these effects 
suffice, for Stuxnet to be qualified as an armed attack? There is destruction but no 
fatalities. I am not in a position to answer this, however in the Tallinn Manual Stuxnet 
is at least declared as a use of force,209 also acknowledged by Harrison Dinniss.210 
Some of the experts even consider it amounting to armed attack.211  
 
Schmitt concludes that an effects-based approach is a new normative standard of 
interpreting the use of force, which might lead to unpredictability and inconsistency 
compared to the instrument-based approach commonly applied earlier.212 A new 
standard might need new consent,213 which I interpret, as there is a need for a new 
treaty. On the other hand, it would be possible to argue that it is as inconsistent, not to 
exclude means, not covered by the wording of the Charter. 
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If it is not possible to equate a computer network attack with an armed attack, it 
would most possibly at least reach a level of threatening peace and security followed 
by the possible countermeasures from the Security Council according to article 39 of 
the Charter. 
 
Potential consequences of Stuxnet might be that if Stuxnet is seen as an armed attack 
on Iran and can be attributable to the U.S., Iran has an inherent right to self-defence 
according to article 51 UN Charter. This means that it might be possible for Iran to 
defend itself, for example with armed force. However, the self-defence has to be 
necessary and proportionate. On the other hand, the U.S. might claim that Stuxnet was 
an act of anticipatory self-defence against an Iranian nuclear weapons threat. These 
are interesting thoughts but will only serve as example of a possible international 
computer network conflict. 
 
3.4 The attribution problem 
 
I would like to point at the attribution problem associated with computer network 
attacks - the problem with attributing the attack to a state. This is one of the most 
difficult problems concerning computer network attacks because the more 
sophisticated the attack is, the more difficult it is to trace its origin. Even if it would 
be clear that a computer network attack could be considered as an armed attack the 
victim would still have to know who the attacker is, to be able to defend itself. The 
attacker will try to cover traces as effectively as possible to minimise the risk of 
detection.214 
 
Perhaps guidelines can be found in International Humanitarian Law (IHL) concerning 
defining military targets? At least attacks from state agents de jure and de facto might 
possibly be attributable to a state.215 According to IHL, persons that are combatants, 
members of organized armed groups and civilians directly participating in the 
hostilities are considered to be military targets. 216  This might be one way of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 Internets mörka sidor Om cyberhot och informationskrigföring, Heickerö, p 32. 
215 Cyberwarfare and International Law, Melzer, p 24.	  
216 Ibid., p 29. 
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attributing programmers of a computer network attack to a state and therefore 
attribute the attack to that state. In the Tallinn Manual principles of guidance for 
attribution have been put forward.217 For example the Experts express that a single 
individual can cause an attack attributable to a state as long as it was under the 
direction of that state.218 
 
Graham is advocating “imputed” 219  responsibility instead of “conclusive” 220 
responsibility.221 In my opinion, this is a dangerous way of attributing a computer 
network attack to a state, possibly with grave consequences if the attribution is 
incorrect and a right to self-defence of armed force follows the attack. For example, in 
computer network attacks like DDOS it is common that botnets222 are used and 
computers from many states can be involved. The owners of most of the computers 
are not even aware that their computer is used in the botnet. Would it be reasonable 
that the attack would be attributed to all states where computers are involved in the 
botnet? To me this does not seem reasonable. If a sole person, without any connection 
to the government of that state, direct a computer network attack on another state, it 
would seem more reasonable that this would be a question of national criminal law. 
However, there may be a question, of international character, on which state can 
prosecute such a crime. Roscini mentions that some authors are of the point of view 
that a state should be able to defend itself without firstly attributing the attack to 
another state but Roscini directly rejects this idea by saying that it is illogical and ask 
himself to whom a victim would direct its self-defence.223  
 
In the Tallinn Manual a majority of the experts shares the opinion that even a 
computer network attack from non-state actors,224 for example terrorist groups, can be 
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  Tallinn	  Manual,	  Chapter	  I,	  Section	  2,	  Rule	  6-­‐8	  and	  11.	  218	  Ibid.,	  Chapter	  II,	  Section	  2,	  Rule	  13,	  para	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  219	  That	  attacks;	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223 World Wide Warfare - Jus ad bellum and the Use of Cyber Force, Roscini, p 119. 
224 For further reading see: Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War, Harrison Dinniss, chapter 
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seen as armed attack with a right to self-defence for the victim-state.225 This is partly 
due to the development of international law after 9/11 – 2001 and the Al Qaeda attack 
on the U.S., where the right to self-defence was acknowledged in resolutions from the 
Security Council.226 A general right to self-defence against attacks from non-state 
actors is probably not fully accepted in the international community and a proof of 
this is that a minority of the experts were not prepared to acknowledge such a rule.227 
The ICJ did not accept such a rule when the attack came from within the territory of 
the state in the Advisory Opinion on the Palestinian Wall.228     
 
4  Conclusion 	  
The Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations demonstrates the background and 
purpose of the Charter. Reading it I believe that war should be avoided in any way 
possible rather than finding new excuses to go to war. However, it would also be 
unsatisfactory if states would not be allowed to defend themselves against attacks that 
do not fit into the template of the Charter. 
 
I have in my research on computer network attacks in international law found that 
many states strive for defining their actions against computer network attacks as a 
lawful use of force in self-defence of an armed attack. To reach this right to self-
defence many arguments have been put forward. 
 
In chapter 3.1 I have concluded what the concepts of use of force and armed attack 
generally are considered to comprise. Many of the arguments for what the concepts 
are understood to include have also been applied to whether a computer network 
attack can be considered as an armed attack or not. By concluding that the UN 
Charter and customary international law are two different bodies of law and the 
concepts of use of force and armed attack exist in both of them I have found that a 
certain flexibility of the interpretation of the concepts have helped developing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 Tallinn Manual, Chapter II, Section 2, Rule 13, para 16 (both). 
226 Ibid., Rule 13, para 16 (both) and S/RES/1373 (2001) and S/RES/1368 (2001). 
227 Tallinn Manual, Chapter II, Section 2, Rule 13, para 16-17. 
228 Advisory Opinion on the Palestinian Wall, para 139.	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international law on resort to force by making it applicable to new technologies and 
new types of warfare. Even though the content of the concepts may be similar in both 
bodies of law there may be differences nonetheless. While the Charter is applicable to 
the states that are members of the UN, customary international law is applicable to 
non-member states. However, principles of customary law, not codified in the 
Charter, are applicable to all states.  
 
One of the arguments for applying the concept of armed attack to computer network 
attacks, borrowed from both the Advisory Opinion on Nuclear weapons and the 
Definition of Aggression, is that the weapon used is not of decisive matter. The 
Charter and customary international law and the concepts of use of force and armed 
attack have previously been applied to nuclear weapons, biological weapons and 
similar weapons that do not directly fall under the wording of the Charter. The ability 
to apply the concepts of use of force and armed attack to such means shows 
international law’s ability to adjust to new types of warfare and societal norms at the 
time being and that the law governing resort to force develops over time, alongside 
with society. Even acts performed by non-regular forces have been declared as 
possibly reaching the level of an armed attack as long as the scale and effects are 
comparable with an armed attack and it is a cross border incident. In my opinion, 
cyber commands may be equated with non-regular forces. Their actions can probably 
have similar effects as an armed attack if, for example, disrupting traffic lights, which 
result in fatalities or large-scale destruction. 
 
I believe that international law will develop from an instrument-based approach to an 
effects-based approach in order to be able to interpret the concepts of use of force and 
armed attack in regards to computer network attacks. However, a difficulty with the 
effects-based approach will be to foresee all potential effects of computer network 
attacks. 
 
The general scale and effects criteria are among the strongest criteria put forward by 
authors for applying the concept of armed attack to computer network attacks. When 
the scale and effects of a computer network attack are of such gravity as to amount to 
an armed attack most authors find it logical that the victim-state has a right to defend 
itself with armed force or with computer network attacks. If the object of a computer 
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network attack is humans or property and the result is fatalities or destruction of 
property the act can amount to an armed attack. Some authors propose that economic 
coercion can reach the level of an armed attack and that a computer network attack, 
with an effect like a stock market crash, may be an armed attack. However, since it is 
difficult to foresee all potential effects and compare them to other effects it is best to 
consider every case separately.  
 
As there is no clear definition of the concept of armed attack a few other general 
criteria have been put forward and been applied to computer network attacks in order 
to decide if an act is considered as an armed attack. These criteria are: sufficient 
gravity, intention and scope, duration and intensity. After conducting this research I 
have found that there is no consensus about intention as criterion while scope, 
duration and intensity	  as well as the criterion of sufficient gravity still seem to have 
certain importance when considering a computer network attack as an armed attack. 
Also the criterion that if computer network attacks are referred to as weapons or 
warfare have been applied by some authors. 
 
In regard to the use of force the most central question is whether the concept should 
be interpreted in a restrictive or permissive way - if the term covers only armed force 
or if other forms of force are included as well, for example economic coercion. This 
question is also key when arguing against the application of the concept of armed 
attack to computer network attacks, namely, that the concept should be interpreted in 
a restrictive way and exclude every use of force that is not directly understood as 
armed force. The restrictive interpretation reserves the right to self-defence to the 
worst cases to avoid stretching the meaning of the concepts. Against this argument it 
is argued that the travaux préparatoires of the Charter did not exclude other forms of 
force than armed force. 
 
Many states already have cyber commands or cyber units and military strategies 
concerning computer network attacks and I believe that this can indicate on a 
development of state practice considering computer network attacks as a use of force 
and an armed attack. I would not, with my knowledge, say that the state practice is 
very well developed but I believe that it will develop increasingly the coming years as 
more states develop cyber capabilities and therefore also become states with specially 
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affected interests.229 Regarding opinio juris I find it hard to state if this is developed 
or not regarding computer network attacks as an armed attack. I believe that the U.S. 
will play an important part in the development of customary international law on 
computer network attacks because the U.S. is a leading country in computer network 
technology and has already stated that, in military strategies and public 
announcements from President Obama,	   that it will defend itself from computer 
network attacks. 
   
According to customary international law a threat must be imminent in order to have 
the right to use self-defence in anticipation of an armed attack. The self-defence must 
be necessary and proportionate to the threat perceived. These principles will also be 
applied to computer network attacks if they are considered as an armed attack. 
However it will be difficult to estimate what is necessary and proportionate self-
defence against an attack that is hard to detect and difficult to attribute to another state 
and an attack of which the effects are difficult to foresee.     
 
I can conclude that in this paper I have been referring to sources in general positive to 
the possibility to apply the concepts of use of force and armed attack in the UN 
Charter and customary international law to computer network attacks. Opposing 
arguments are mainly found in the general restrictive view of the use of force and 
armed attack. Maybe we can expect an Advisory opinion from the ICJ or resolution 
from The General Assembly or Security Council regarding computer network attacks 
in a not too distant future.230 
 
A problem with international law, significant regarding computer network attacks, is 
that it is constructed to only concern state actors while non-governmental groups are 
excluded form this part of law. This is problematic as these groups may also use, and 
already do use, computer network attacks for whatever purpose they might have.231 
However, the applicability of international law to non-state actors is already discussed 
in the international community. We might see a change in the treatment and the right 
to act towards these groups as international law develops. To illustrate the presence of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 See footnote 179 and North Sea Continental Shelf, para 174. 
230 UN Charter, article 96. 
231 For example the group Anonymous’s attacks on Sweden in October 2012, see footnote 26.	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non-state actors I would like to quote the Anonymous with a quote taken from a film 
published just before the group’s attacks on Sweden:  
 
 
“ … WE ARE LEGION 
WE DO NOT FORGIVE 
WE DO NOT FORGET 
EXPECT US.”232 
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